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While distinguishing between the actions and physical boundaries of self and other
(non-self) is usually straightforward there are contexts in which such differentiation is
challenging. For example, self–other ambiguity may occur when actions of others are
similar or complementary to those of the self. Even in the absence of such situational
challenges, individuals experiencing hallucinations have difficulties with this distinction,
often experiencing thoughts or actions of self as belonging to other agents. This paper
explores the role of ambiguity in self–other differentiation, drawing from developmental,
psychodynamic, and neurocognitive perspectives. A key proposal is that engagement in
contexts that make distinctions between self and other challenging yet necessary allow
reality-testing skills related to agency to develop. Attunement in typical caregiver–infant
interactions is framed as a safe but inherently ambiguous environment that provides
optimal condition for the infant to develop a coherent self–other sense. Vulnerability
to psychosis may be related to limited access to such an environment in early
development. However, the perceptual, cognitive, and social skills that contribution to
attribution are likely to be malleable following infancy and improve though opportunities
for boundary play in similarly ambiguous settings. Using music-making to illustrate,
we postulate that engagement in intricate joint-actions that blurs agentic boundaries
can contribute to the continued development of an adaptive sense of self and other
essential to healthy social functioning. Increased insight into the self–other ambiguity
may enhance our understanding of mechanisms underlying “self-disorders” such as
schizophrenia and eventually extend the range of social and arts-based therapeutic
possibilities.
Keywords: ambiguity, sense of self, attunement, joint action, mental health
“The brain abhors ambiguity, yet we are curiously attracted to it”
Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 2008
INTRODUCTION
Being alive is to possess a boundary or membrane that delimitates the inside from the outside,
regulating what is kept in and let out, as well as what is kept out and let in. Awareness of the
dynamic relationships that exist between oneself, one’s surroundings, and other agents is a primary,
on-going task of the perceptual system (Gibson, 1979; Critchley et al., 2004; Gallagher, 2005;
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Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Damasio, 2012). But how do we
do this? When we do things, how do you know that it is
“us” as opposed to another that is doing it? In most situations
identifying one’s own self as separate from surroundings and
other individuals and being able to attribute behaviors and events
to their respective sources seems relatively straightforward and
an essential part of everyday actions and interactions. However,
there are times when this task is challenging, where information
for distinguishing self from other (non-self) is either reduced
or cannot be identified. While perceptual challenges of this
sort have commonly been associated with phenomena such
as hallucinations and delusions, self-other ambiguity can also
exist as a characteristic of the external environment. Drawing
from perceptual and developmental psychology, neuroscience,
and psychodynamic theory, we explore the interaction between
individual and environmental factors, proposing that ambiguity
plays an important role in the development of an adaptive,
flexible, and coherent sense of self essential to mental health and
wellbeing through life.
DEFINING THE SELF
The sense of self (and of “other selves”) is a perceptual,
cognitive, and conceptual organizing system by which we
encounter the world (e.g., James, 1891; Rogers, 1961; Stern,
1985; Damasio, 2003; Baumeister and Bushman, 2011), which
is central to any understanding of human psychology and
mental health. Yet still, its conceptualization remains mired in
a theoretical quagmire (Baumeister, 1987; Berrios and Markova,
2003; Guignon, 2004; Klein, 2012; Gallagher, 2013) because sense
of self is a complex and multifaceted construct involving over-
arching and over-lapping processes like consciousness, agency,
memory, and social and cultural identity (Gallagher, 2000;
Klein and Gangi, 2010; Leary and Tangney, 2011). Typically,
however, theoretical accounts share a similar focus on the
sensory-motor and mental processes which endow one with
feelings of singularity, stability, and coherence as an individual
human being (Siegel, 2001; Damasio, 2003). A distinction is also
commonly made between a “minimal” or “core” self, accessible
to immediate self-consciousness as moment-to-moment streams
of multisensory, perceptual, and affective experience, and a
narrative or “extended” self drawing, for example, on higher
order mental representations and episodic memory (Stern, 1985;
Siegel, 2001; Sass and Parnas, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Klein and
Gangi, 2010). The former – the main focus of the current
paper – is an essentially embodied phenomenon encompassing
a sense of body (bodily unity/coherence), ownership, and
agency, which, crucially, allows the differentiation of self
from other/environment. The latter encompasses a sense of
self-identity and personhood often over a longer time-frame
(Gallagher, 2013). Although discrete phenomena, theorists have
emphasized the inter-dependency between these lower and
higher order configurations, with multiple layers of self regarded
as operating in parallel throughout life. For Stern (1985), for
example, the achievement of a “core self ” between 2 and 7 months
of age not only sets the ground work for the subsequent
emergence of “verbal” and “narrative” selves, but also establishes
a sense of one’s self as a unified and integrated but separate
being. Thus, this functioning core self is essential for maintaining
mental health across the lifespan, keeping at bay feelings such as
dissociation and fragmentation (Fink, 1988).
Aside from the identification of different types of self (Klein,
2012), researchers across domains have emphasized the inherent
malleability of these differing “selves.” Anthropologists argue
that definitions of self are, at least in part, culturally determined
and vary across time and place, where sense of self is regarded as
more or less fluid in distinct socio-cultural contexts (Baumeister,
1987; Guignon, 2004; Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008;
Benning, 2013). Childhood researchers likewise highlight how
the emergence of a sense of self across developmental milestones
and in tandem with wider developmental achievements
occurs in transaction with necessary environmental inputs.
While not denying the influence of genetic inheritance, the
neurological/biological basis of one’s sense of self is shaped
to a large extent through interactions in the infant’s social
environment and interpersonal relationships (Damasio, 1999;
Siegel, 2001; Schore, 2003, 2015; Tronick, 2007).
PHYSICAL AND AGENTIC BOUNDARIES
OF SELF AND OTHER
From the very start of life, we learn that there are fundamental
differences between the outcomes of our own actions and the
outcomes that results from the behavior of others around us
(see White, 1995, 50–56); we come to experience direct control
over our actions and an ability to move and manipulate objects,
surfaces, and even, eventually and to a certain extent, the actions
and thoughts of other agents (Gibson and Pick, 2000, 160).
This experience relies on knowing the boundaries of entities,
where one thing ends and another begins. But how are such
boundaries determined, particularly those that exist between self
and other agents? Put in more concrete terms, how can sensory
signals deriving from the presence or movements of one entity be
disentangled from those belonging to another?
It has been argued that we do this by relying on invariants –
gestalt-like regularities about the characteristics of animate and
inanimate objects (Gibson, 1966; Stern, 1985; Bregman, 1994;
Palmer, 2003). For example, an object tends to possess unity:
its parts move together when they move or are moved. The
stimuli generated by such movement, whether picked up in the
form of sound, light, taste, or pressure, are therefore likely to
seem coherent and perceived as belonging together (Rock and
Palmer, 1990). The sounds of a person speaking, for instance,
derive from a similar location and change together gradually
rather than suddenly, sharing a common temporal and intensity
structure. Sounds that do not share this coherence, such as an
utterance that is suddenly much louder or derives from a different
location, suggest the presence of another speaker. Therefore,
while coherence is the norm (an invariant) within entities,
incoherence is expected between them and is therefore used
to mark their distinction. Separate entities segregate by virtue
of their distinctness: they occupy different locations to other
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nearby objects and surfaces and tend to move independently,
generating stimuli with temporal and intensity profiles that are
incoherent/mismatched in relation to one another.
As the above examples indicate, the boundaries of entities and,
in particular, those of animate entities are determined by how
stimulus features such as intensity, timing, and shape vary over
time (Stern, 2010). Stimuli with matching profiles are perceived
as belonging together and having derived from a coherent entity
(Figure 1). As Stern (1985, 154) argues, such dynamic features
are amodal in the sense that they describe variation in signals
picked up in all sensory modalities, including those originating
from within the body (also see Lewkowicz and Turkewitz, 1980;
Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1982; Stein and Meredith, 1993; Pascual-
Leone and Hamilton, 2001). For example, a sudden increase of
intensity does not only refer to changes in aspects of sound, light,
touch, and smell, but also to variation in more covert signals
such as proprioceptive feedback or an affective sensation such
as fear. Significant to agency, it can also describe the content of
sensorimotor as well as longer-term predictions that one forms
about the results of actions as they unfold over time.
Coherence between stimuli originating outside and inside
the body provides essential information about which entity
corresponds to self as opposed to other, contributing to the feeling
of self-agency, the sense that “I am in control and the source of
my thoughts and actions” (Gallagher, 2000). Control is therefore
not only central to the experience of being an agent, but also
key to understanding the dynamics of social interaction. Changes
in the sense of agency have been described as an alteration of
the perceived control over the relationship between actions and
outcomes (Moore et al., 2009; Desantis et al., 2011). It derives
in part from basic physiological systems of the body in relation
to sensory stimuli (Von Holst, 1954; Jeannerod, 2003; Poulet
and Hedwig, 2007). As the “comparator model” suggests, events
that match the predicted consequences of action are experienced
as belonging to self (prediction error is small), while mismatch
(or large prediction error) is attributed to an external cause
(Gandevia and Burke, 1992; Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Frith
et al., 2000; Trinity and Sommer, 2008). In other words, an
invariant of agency is that the difference between predicted
variation in the intensity, timing, and shape of an action and
the actual intensity, timing, and shape of the resulting stimuli
is likely to be small when that action belongs to self, compared
to when it belongs to another individual. Stimuli belonging
to self as opposed to another agent are likely to vary with a
number of other covert (internally derived) signals not directly
accessible to other individuals. The latter could include signals
that precede, accompany, or follow actions, such as volition (as
well as higher order intentions and goals), action prediction,
sensory and proprioceptive feedback, affective sensation, as well
as the evaluation of past behavior (Stern, 1985; Gallagher, 2000;
Wegner, 2002; Wegner et al., 2004).
Although this paper is primarily concerned with lower level
perceptual processes, it is worth noting that the sense of
agency implicates control specified at different hierarchical levels.
Synofzik et al. (2008) make a distinction between a low-level, pre-
reflective “feeling of agency” and a more explicit “judgment of
agency” where self–other attribution exists at a higher conceptual
level. While neurocognitive agency research has tended to either
focus on internal sensorimotor processes (Blakemore et al., 2002;
Haggard, 2005) or external situational factors (Wegner, 2002,
Wegner, 2003), social psychology literature has addressed higher
level attribution (Kassin et al., 2010). Experimental measures
used to investigate dimensions of agency are therefore diverse,
ranging from explicit psychometric and verbal reporting to
implicit paradigms such as intentional binding (Haggard et al.,
2002). Together these findings suggest that the sense of agency
is influenced by varied cues and by an ability to integrate them
with one another (Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Kranick and Hallett,
2013).
AMBIGUITY BETWEEN SELF–OTHER
BOUNDARIES
In most situations, stimulus features either vary coherently
or incoherently in relation to one or more entities, with
available sensory modalities pointing in the same direction. This
enables boundaries that exist between entities including self and
other and the control that these have over occurrences to be
clearly defined. However, rather than seen as binary opposites,
there is evidence that coherence and incoherence are better
conceptualized as opposite ends of a continuum (Farrer et al.,
2003). With effort, an agent can generate stimuli that are partially
incoherent, adopting a characteristic more commonly associated
with a number of unrelated objects or agents. A ventriloquist,
for example, rapidly changes the quality of her/his voice to
promote the illusion of being in the presence of more than one
individual (Howard and Templeton, 1966; Soto-Faraco et al.,
2002; Alais and Burr, 2004). Autonomous agents can also act with
partial coherence in relation to one another, generating stimuli
that vary with a degree of synchrony more typical of a single
agent, such as a group of individuals marching together (McNeill,
1997).
Furthermore, actions belonging to self can display a degree of
incoherence between internal signals such as action predictions
and external feedback: consider the experience of using a
malfunctioning computer mouse where visual feedback does not
correspond to intended and performed actions. Experiments that
set up to investigate mechanisms of agency typically introduce
spatial or temporal distortions to the outcome of a participant’s
actions to manipulate the authorship that a person feels over
that action (Blakemore et al., 2000; Franck et al., 2001; Sato
and Yasuda, 2005; Farrer and Franck, 2007). As action–outcome
discordance increases (e.g., using delay or spatial displacement),
the participant is more likely to disown the sensory feedback,
attributing it instead to an external cause. The opposite is also
possible. Signals related to actions of self, including intentions,
predictions, proprioception, and affective sensation, can be
coherent with externally generated stimuli. This is demonstrated
by Wegner et al. (2004) who found that having thoughts
that happened to be coherent with an action performed by
the experimenter made participants more likely to experience
ownership over that action – a phenomena that they called
vicarious agency.
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FIGURE 1 | Defining ambiguity between self and other boundaries. Time-series represent sensory signals/stimuli (lines). These signals can either be overt (externally
accessible, e.g., sound, vision, and smell) or covert (inner-body signals accessible to self, e.g., proprioception, volition, action prediction, and emotion sensations). All
signals can vary in multiple ways, e.g., modulating in intensity, timing, shape, location, and form over time. Coherence between such signals within entities (e.g., self)
and incoherence between entities (self and other) is the default (invariant) and allows us to easily perceive the world as it is, i.e., the actual physical and agentic
boundaries that exist between entities (A). Invariant can be disrupted: incoherence within and coherence between entities, resulting in illusory boundaries (C).
Ambiguity (B) emerges when invariants are weakened to the extent that signals are partially coherent/incoherent within and/or between entities. Both actual and
illusory boundaries (physical and agentic) are available for perception and the perceiver can switch between these alternatives.
Invariants can, therefore, be weakened. In summary, although
it is the case that changes in intensity, timing and shape
are expected to be coherent within but not between entities,
and interoceptive–exteroceptive coherence is the norm for
self-generated but not for externally generated actions, such
regularities can be partially violated. This can result in the
emergence of conflicting groupings, with some features pointing
toward illusory boundaries or causal relationships and others
specifying “reality” – the actual boundaries or causal relationships
that exist in the world. Informational conflicts may cause us to
momentarily misperceive stimuli deriving from multiple agents
as belonging to a single coherent agent (e.g., the marching
group) or, vice versa, stimuli from a single agent as belonging
to multiple agents (e.g., the ventriloquist). In relation to agency,
we may also feel that our own thoughts, emotions, and actions
and their consequences belong to another individuals. The Ouija
board game exemplifies the latter: the combined force that a
number of participants exert on the centerpiece makes individual
contributions difficult to ascertain, promoting the misattribution
of movement to an external force (under-attribution to self)
(Ansfield and Wegner, 1996). Conversely, the illusory experience
of controlling externally caused events can also occur (over-
attribution to self). One example is a conductor who experiences
a high degree of coherence between his/her actions (and
associated internal signals such as volition and sensorimotor
predictions) and the sensory outcomes of orchestra members’
collective actions (Epstein, 1987). However, given that invariants
can never be completely violated, such misperceptions are fleeting
and rarely complete. Even in controlled settings where there is
an explicit attempt to promote misperceptions, there is generally
always sensory information available that continues to point
toward the state of the world as it is (Gibson, 1966, 1979).
Ambiguity emerges when invariants are weakened to an extent
that multiple conflicting groupings are perceivable, whether these
are actual or illusory entity boundaries or causal relationships (see
Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Roach et al., 2006). In such contexts,
there is insufficient information available to determine which
alternative is preferred due to a balance between coherence
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and incoherence specified by dynamic features of stimuli
across sensory modalities (see Rimmon-Kenan, 1977, 17). The
perceiver is driven to explain or find meaning in the experience.
They conduct a series of overt and covert reality tests when
faced with inadequate or conflicting information, such as head
movements or attention shifts, to search for “information that
will reinforce one or the other alternative” (Gibson, 1966,
303–304). As Ramachadran and Rogers-Ramachandran (2008)
contend, “the brain abhors ambiguity, yet we are curiously
attracted to it” – an attraction which may have evolved due to
the need for organisms to have an incentive to uncover objects,
such as predators, from complex environments (Ramachandran
and Hirstein, 1999). Where disambiguating information is
limited, the perceptual process is necessarily prolonged, as
exemplified by the incessant alternation between the possible
alternatives that characterize the viewing of bistable images
(e.g., duck or rabbit) (Wernery, 2013). Ambiguity in effect
disrupts habitual perception and subjective experience – one
is compelled to look and listen again (Rose, 2004, 148–149).
Artists, writers, and performers have long understood and
exploited this (Rimmon-Kenan, 1977, 229). Gibson (1979, 44)
explains that picture-makers enhance esthetic experience by
introducing “a discrepancy of information, an equivocation, or
contradiction in the same display,” while restricting the amount
of additional information that can be gathered through objective
scrutiny.
AMBIGUITY AND THE DEVELOPING
SELF
Ambiguity in the perception of entity boundaries, particularly
relating to self and other, is a pervasive feature in accounts
of infantile experience and early processes of separation,
individuation, and sensory integration. Although rudimentary
processes of self–other differentiation including self-agency are
commonly thought to be evident from birth (Meltzoff and Moore,
1995; Rochat, 2003), it is generally accepted that an infant’s
sense of self emerges at psychological and neurobiological levels
through its relationships with others (Bowlby, 1973; Damasio,
1999; Siegel, 2001; Perry, 2002; Tronick, 2007; Schore, 2015).
This is supported by evidence for shared neural networks for
processing self and other in multiple brain areas including
cortical midline, frontal, and parietal structures (reviewed in
Frith, 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007).
Following the physical separation that begins from the
first moments of post-natal life, the human baby is primed
to respond to and attract the social contact required for its
survival and development (Stern, 1985; Siegel, 2001; Schore,
2003, 2015; Tronick, 2007). The caregiver’s first role is not
only to provide physiological protection and nourishment but
also emotional containment and feelings of self-coherence by
regulating his or her changing levels of arousal associated
with internally and externally derived sensations. Responding
to fluctuating sensorimotor and affective cues, the caregiver
seeks, for example, to calm a distressed or over-excitable
infant, entertain a passive infant, and temporarily withdraw
when an infant is overstimulated, while also attributing intent
and agency to such covert behaviors (Brazelton et al., 1974;
Gergely et al., 2002; Fonagy, 2003). Ensuring the infant enjoys
sufficient periods of calm to engage in self-perception-based
exploratory play also contributes to the early sense of self by
means of “the intermodal calibration of the body” (Rochat,
1998).
Drawing on micro-observational studies examining infant–
caregiver interactions on a moment-to-moment basis, Stern’s
(1985) work emphasizes the importance of attunement processes,
achieved as the caregiver matches to or mirrors the dynamic
features of behaviors, particularly those expressing variation in an
infant’s internal affective states. By minimizing the separateness
that typically exists between entities, caregivers intuitively
seeking to reduce a younger baby’s potential frustrations and
distress allow the infant to experience an illusion of oneness
and pleasurable feelings of agency and extended control over
surroundings (Winnicott, 1960, 1971; Gergely and Watson, 1996;
Fosha, 2001; Glover, 2009; Dowds, 2014). An example of this is
a parent who attunes to the intensity, timing, and shape of a
baby’s animated movements (e.g., raised and lowered arms) by
means of accompanying vocalizations (e.g., “wheee!”) matching
the rise, fall, and overall excitation levels inherent in the infant’s
gestures.
As this scenario exemplifies, empirical work suggests that
rather than solely imitating the infant’s behavior, the caregiver,
over time, begins to translate the contours of that behavior into
an alternative sensory modality (Jonsson et al., 2001; Crown et al.,
2002; Beebe et al., 2010). In perceptual terms, this transformation
not only emphasizes the dynamic features of behavior (given
that these remain the same), but also provides the infant with
opportunities to learn to, weigh up, and synthesize information
from differing modalities that specify internal and external states.
That dynamic features are matched in one modality but not
another functions to educate attention and help promote sensory
integration – the development of a normal sense of self depends
on emerging abilities to integrate multisensory input (Postmes
et al., 2014). According to Stern (1985), however, it does much
more than this in that it also helps the infant to grasp that the
caregiver is not only able to mimic his or her literal behavior, but
has understood the affective sensations underlying it. Ultimately,
this conveys to the infant that external actions but also internal
subjective states of mind in the self and other can be known
and shared – an important step in the acquisition of what has
variously been called a mentalizing capacity (Fonagy et al., 2004;
Frith and Frith, 2006), theory of mind and empathy (Premack
and Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen, 1991; Corcoran et al., 1995).
Given that some aspects of behavior are attuned to, while
others are not, and that dynamic features may be matched in
one modality but not another, there will always be sensory
information continuing to point to the caregiver–infant as
separate, distinct entities. With reference to the illustration of
cross-modal attunement above, while coherence or “oneness” is
specified in the correspondence between the infant’s motions and
caregiver’s sounds, there is a mismatch between the agents’ arm
movements which make conflicting cues available to the infant.
The fact is there is no such thing as a perfect attunement with
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a degree of incoherence always pointing toward to divergences
between infant and caregiver as distinct agents. Indeed, moments
of misattunement, whether purposeful or unintentional (the
over or under shooting of behavior contours), are as necessary
as episodes of attunement to help the growing infant identify
and integrate the invariants that distinguish its experience of
itself from an other as an embodied, feeling, and, eventually,
thinking being (Stern, 1985; Fonagy and Target, 1996; Tronick,
2007). As clinicians and researchers have noted, too much, as
well as too little attunement coherence are both detrimental to
developmental outcomes in this regard (Stern, 1985; Jaffe et al.,
2001; Fonagy, 2003). There may be a critical tipping point that is
key to life chances and outcomes between enough, not enough,
and too much attunement.
The overall implicit goal is healthy ambiguity: a balance
emerges over shorter and/or longer periods of time in
the fluctuation of attunement/misattunement, between stimuli
pointing toward caregiver–infant togetherness (coherence) and
separateness (incoherence). In the “wider-world” situations that
do not allow self and its outcomes to be distinguished from
surroundings can be dangerous and perceived as such. The
infant’s gradual awareness of his/her separateness and agentic
limits (the reality of self/other bounds) is likely to rouse
unpleasant feelings associated with helplessness and dependency.
The sensitive caregiver responds by creating a safe yet sufficiently
motivating context in which the infant is invited to explore and
play with the boundaries between self and other and, at the
same time, his or her own internal and external experiences.
While the precise manner in which the caregiver facilitates
such implicit learning varies across development, perceptual
play in a variety of forms continues to promote awareness of
self–other boundaries by bridging the subjective world of the
imagination and the outer world of people and things (Winnicott,
1971; Milner, 2010). Being continuously called upon to compare
fluctuations in the degree of coherence that exists between entity
boundaries and internally and externally derived signals provides
the individual with optimal conditions for honing the perceptual,
social, and cognitive competencies required for a functioning
sense of self and of agency. As Winnicott, Milner, Segal, and
others contend (see Glover, 2009), this in-between space is
also the basis of creativity and a capacity to symbolize (to be
non-literal or pretend) in the context of verbal thinking and
communication with others. In contrast to persisting romantic
notions of creativity as the cathartic endeavor of a lone genius,
these authors argue that it emerges not by losing touch with
reality or with others, retreating into one’s inner world, but
instead by an increasingly refined awareness of, and playful
engagement with the boundaries between internal and external
experience – through a fluid interplay between the two.
In brief, ambiguity provides a way of thinking about
mechanisms relevant to early psychological development.
Attunement–misattunement fluctuations in typical caregiver–
infant interactions are framed as a safe but inherently ambiguous
environment. The coherent sense of self and other develops
through ambiguity by making self–other differentiation
simultaneously necessary, motivating (often playful) and
challenging.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH
Closely allied to this facility to differentiate self and other is
an ability to distinguish between what is real from what is
imagined, made up, or simulated (Fonagy, 2003; Sutton-Smith,
2009). Ecological psychologists contend that the perception
of the tangible, external world is always distinguishable from
that of mental life such as dreams and hallucination, in that
the latter does not yield additional information when subject
to scrutiny or “reality tested” (e.g., scanning with eye, head,
hand, and body movements). Gibson (1970) argues that the
reason individuals experience hallucinations or “psychedelic
experiences” as external reality reflects either an inability
or disinclination to apply the necessary perceptual tests, for
example, when under the influence of drugs or during periods
of psychological distress. This is supported by theoretical models
that understand psychosis as a deficit in information processing
(Bellack et al., 1990; Green and Horan, 2010; Savla et al., 2012;
Aleman, 2014) or impaired salience assignment also associated
with hyperdopaminergic neural state (Kapur, 2003; Winton-
Brown et al., 2014). Although conflicting cues in the environment
are what motivates the search for additional information,
ambiguity can stimulate anxiety, impacting on the efficiency and
conclusions of ongoing thinking as well as the capacity to apply
appropriate reality tests when required (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992;
Beck and Clark, 1997; Maule et al., 2000). One result can be
a tendency to over-rely on biases or prior knowledge that no
longer apply (Corcoran et al., 2006; Bennett and Corcoran, 2010),
with an urge to adopt new certainties too quickly, before a new
pattern has had the chance to emerge (Bion, 1970, 124). Notably,
an inability to tolerate ambiguity and a proclivity to jump to
conclusions in uncertain contexts has been consistently linked to
psychopathological disorders including psychosis (Budner, 1962;
Linney et al., 1998; Colbert and Peters, 2002; Grube, 2002; Van
Dael et al., 2006; Broome et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2011).
Social psychologists have examined how individuals respond
to socially ambiguous situations (Heider, 2013). In this literature,
the term “attribution” is used to explain how individuals
find causes for their own or others’ behavior (Kelley, 1967).
Particularly when outcomes of behavior are predictable, causes
can be ascribed to internal or dispositional factors such as
an individual’s (or a group’s) motives, beliefs, and personality
traits. They can also be ascribed to external, situational forces
that go beyond one’s control (Moskowitz, 2005; Kassin et al.,
2010; Heider, 2013). Attribution theory assumes that people
make causal inferences rationally by assessing the wider social
context of behavior. However, attributions do not always
accurately reflect reality. In socially ambiguous contexts, they
are particularly susceptible to systematic biases. Erroneous
assumptions about a person’s behavior, for example, can be
based on whether or not outcomes are desirable and on
social groupings (in-group/out-group) (Forsyth and Donelson,
1987). There is a tendency to see success as related one’s own
disposition with failure ascribed to situational factors (blaming
surrounding), while the opposite is the case when assessing
others, particularly those outside the group (a self/group-serving
bias) (Myers and Smith, 2012). Although ambiguity calls for
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a search for further information, individuals also tend to also
gloss over informational gaps when attributing behaviors to
others, giving undue salience to readily available information
as an alternative to continued reality testing. Many dimensions
are thought to influence attributional style including culture
(e.g., individualistic vs. collectivist societies), language, beliefs,
as well as clinical conditions such as paranoia and depression.
Individuals vulnerable to depression, for example, tend to
attribute their own failures to internal, stable, and global factors
(Abramson et al., 1978; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987).
A hostility perception bias – the tendency to experience others’
intention as hostile in ambiguous settings – has been associated
with paranoia, traits of emotional dysregulation, and theory of
mind difficulties in both clinical and non-clinical populations
(Combs et al., 2009; An et al., 2010; Jeon et al., 2013). Such
biases may be seen as constituting a repertoire of adaptive and
maladaptive strategies that people rely upon in social exchanges
that almost always involve a degree of ambiguity. But are there
ways of protecting against such biases or short cuts to continued
thinking?
Early experience in a safe environment that allows actual
and illusory boundaries to be evaluated and compared one with
the other without confusing the two develops the ability and
propensity to conduct appropriate reality tests on the corporeal
and agentic boundaries of self and other. The ambiguous play
facilitated by the caregiver enables the infant to experiences
different states of self and other over time, leading to a sense
of self that is more resilient and adaptive to the internal and
external changes that occur throughout life. There is less need to
resort to ready-made attributional biases. By contrast, situations
where reality is always or never clear-cut, where invariants
specifying entity or agency boundaries remain unchallenged
and rarely come into conflict, are not likely to afford such
opportunities for psycho-social development. Fonagy (2003)
contends that the most crucial outcome of a secure attachment
relationship in childhood is the ability to distinguish between
and realistically appraise self and other, rather than the usually
cited engendered feelings of safety and self-confidence per se.
Individuals who do not acquire the competencies required to
maintain a distinction between representations of self and other –
where the actions and/or feelings of one are habitually confused
and misattributed to the other – may have to develop less
adaptive strategies to amplify the differences between the two,
through for example forms of social withdrawal or preoccupation
with other. More generally, all mental illness may be viewed
as the mind misinterpreting its own experience of itself and of
other (Fonagy and Campbell, 2015), with a failure to establish
developmentally appropriate constructs of self in the early years
implicated in the etiology of various disorders (Fink, 1988; Kyrios
et al., 2015). This is particularly apparent in agency-related
phenomena such as hallucinations and delusions of control
thought to be rooted in difficulties in differentiating between
thoughts, intentions, and actions belonging to self from those
belonging to others (Spence et al., 1997; Parnas and Handest,
2003; Sass and Parnas, 2003; Woodruff, 2004; Lindner et al., 2005;
Ditman and Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 2005; Bentall et al., 2007;
Jeannerod, 2009).
Behavioral and neuroimaging research has begun to shed
additional light on mechanisms underlying the sense of self and
of agency (David et al., 2008; Nahab et al., 2011; Sperduti et al.,
2011) and on the impact of development on such processes
(e.g., Kircher and David, 2003). Early attachment experiences
can positively or negatively shape genetically primed neural
structures that underpin perceptual and cognitive organization
of self (Bowlby, 1973, 1982; Siegel, 2001; Schore, 2003,
2015; Tronick, 2007). For example, a body of research has
focused on experience-dependent maturation and stabilization of
interconnections between the orbitofrontal cortex with cortical
and sub-cortical areas in early life, and the essential role these
associated pathways play in self-regulatory behavior and self-
monitoring (reviewed in Schore, 2015). Likewise, a number of
studies have shown that disrupting parent–infant interactions
during early development can have significant impact on the
development of the prefrontal cortex in humans and other
mammals (reviewed in Kolb et al., 2012). This region, which
has been associated with guiding motor, affective, cognitive,
and social behavior over time (Wood and Grafman, 2003;
Mitchell et al., 2005), is thought to have a prolonged, experience-
dependent development, making it particularly susceptible to
abnormal functioning as expressed in multiple neuropsychiatric
disorders (Stuss et al., 2001; Tekin and Cummings, 2002; Braun
and Bock, 2011).
While the development of a core sense of self/other in infancy
is a specific keystone achievement associated with critical periods
in infancy (Stern, 1985; Fink, 1988; Kyrios et al., 2015), a “mature”
sense of self must be honed through life’s experiences. Indeed,
the development of psychotherapeutic interventions attests to
an understanding that enhancing self-awareness and adjusting
to ever-changing realities is a long-term endeavor. As evidenced
by research into behavioral and brain plasticity (Ponti et al.,
2008; Pascual-Leone et al., 2011; Keller and Just, 2016), the
manner in which a person perceives surroundings is always
susceptible to learning and development, with encounters in the
world presenting limitless opportunities for fine-tuning attention
and sensitivity to novel or previously undetected information
(Gibson, 1979, 254). Below we argue that contexts that blur
the distinctions between self and other, inner and outer, reality
and non-reality, such as artistic or esthetic pursuits involving
intricate joint behavior, may be especially helpful in this regard.
We suggest that in terms of cognitive and affective outcomes they
are analogous to the caregiver–infant interaction processes by
providing a route to guide reality monitoring reflexes and self–
other attribution, leading to an adaptable sense of self. If correct,
it follows that individual differences in self–other attribution and
reality monitoring will be related to experience in these pursuits.
Furthermore, long-term engagement in these pursuits may itself
be predicted by the quality of early caregiver interactions.
AMBIGUITY-PROMOTING BEHAVIORS:
THE CASE OF MUSIC-MAKING
In any social contexts, events tend to be co-produced, neither
fully belonging to self or to other but resulting from the mutually
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regulated actions of both (Sebanz et al., 2006; Konvalinka et al.,
2010; Badino et al., 2014). Interaction always involves, indeed
demands, a weakening of invariants. The coherence that typifies
stimuli deriving from an individual agent and the incoherence
that comes to be expected between autonomous agents is partially
reduced as participants match to the varying intensities, timings,
shapes, or forms of each others’ behavior outcomes. In effect,
this allows a quality of “we-ness” to emerge. Those involved
momentarily function as a larger “whole” or system with its own
emergent properties.
Music-making provides a particularly clear, though by no
means unique, illustration of this. A musician, through thousands
of hours of practice, learns to accurately coordinate highly
intricate movements with those of others to produce specific
auditory effects (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Sloboda, 2000).
The manner in which musical instruments are constructed and
played indicates that controlling the degree of coherence and
incoherence in sound (termed integration and segregation in this
context) is of fundamental importance to all forms of music-
making (Bregman, 1994, 458, 674). In contrast to most listening
experiences where the goal is to detect actual sound-sources in
the environment, music often tries to create illusory sources or
what Bregman (1994, 460) calls “auditory chimeras”: “It [music]
may want the listener to accept the simultaneous roll of the
drum, clash of the cymbal, and brief pulse of noise from the
woodwinds as a single coherent event with its own striking
emergent properties.” This is achieved by going against invariants
of coherence within and incoherence between entities or sound-
sources. It is this skill that much of the effort of acquiring musical
expertise is focused on – whether it be by learning to play in tune
and in time with others or via the technical dexterity that enables
an individual’s sounds to segregate while blending with sounds
produced by other musicians.
The literal meaning of symphony is “sounding together” and
there are many examples where the contributions of individual
musicians are blurred by introducing coherence between separate
entities. This is particularly evident in contexts such as choirs
or percussion ensembles where sound-sources are similar to
one another. In the gamelan traditions of Southeast Asia, for
instance, two or more musicians commonly perform interlocking
patterns designed to be heard as deriving from a single coherent
sound source (Tenzer, 1998; Bakan, 2007). This illusion of
oneness is made possible by virtue of the coherence that exists
between the sounds generated by the two musicians: their close
proximity to one another, the similarity of the timbres produced
by their respective instruments, and in the coherence of intensity,
timing, and pitch material between the contributions. Features
specifying coherence, however, are at the same time balanced
by cues that continue to point toward the incoherence that
persists between autonomous agents both within and between
sensory modalities. In other words it is still possible to see
and partially hear that the two musicians are separate entities
through (albeit slight) differences in spatial location, and in
the variation of intensity, shape, and form associated with each
agent. The fact that this is an effortful task for many of us
might attest to the social processing default of the human
brain.
Conversely, by introducing incoherence characteristic of
stimuli belonging to more than one entity, whether it be through
abrupt changes of pitch range, intensity, timbre, or spatial
location, the sounds of a single musician (sound-source) can
also split and be misperceived as deriving from separate entities.
Partial segregation may be heard in many music traditions:
examples include the abrupt changes of timbre produced by
Chinese dizi flute music (Tsai, 2004), Mongolian diaphonic
chatting (Lindestad et al., 2001), and the pseudo-polyphony
in late Baroque music generated by rapidly switching between
pitch range/register (Davis, 2006). Regarding the latter, Bregman
(1994, 464) writes: “these alternations were not fast enough to
cause compulsory segregation, so the experience was ambiguous
between one and two streams.” Frequently in music partial
incoherence within entities is combined with partial coherence
between them, with sounds belonging to one musician made to
segregate from other sounds generated by the same musician
while merging with components of sound belonging to other
musicians.
Music, among other intricate joint behaviors such as dance,
theater, and certain sports (McNeill, 1997; Sebanz et al., 2006;
Hove, 2008; Overy and Molnar-Szakacs, 2009; Pacherie, 2011),
may therefore be seen as implicitly promoting ambiguous
perception, ensuring that entity boundaries are sufficiently
blurred and that an equilibrium is reached between multimodal
sensory conflicts that point toward togetherness, on the one hand,
and separateness, on the other. As also described in relation to
attunement processes during early development (often described
using musical metaphors, e.g., proto-musicality, Malloch and
Trevarthen, 2009), going against invariants in this way promotes
a drive to test reality characterized by shifts between actual and
illusory boundary alternatives.
When a person is directly involved in ambiguity-promoting
behavior, blurred boundaries extend not only to those between
entities but also to feelings of agency. Take for example the
experience of not being able to distinguish one’s own voice from
those belonging to other group members when singing in a
choir. One moment it might feel that another’s voice belongs
to self (a case of over-attribution to self) and the next that
one’s own voice is not of our own making (over-attribution
to other). This involves semi-coherence between internally and
externally derived signals: the effects of others’ behavior partially
match the manner in which one’s own predictions, as well as
the proprioceptive and affective sensations belonging to self, vary
over time. Ambiguity and the associated feelings of a weakening
of self–other boundaries, which has been referred to as boundary
loss (McNeill, 1997), we-agency (Pacherie, 2011), coupling
(Benzon, 2001), and rhythmic entrainment (Becker, 2004), may
account for some of the powerful perceptual and emotional
responses associated with certain joint behaviors (McLachlan,
2000, 67). Recounting memorable experiences, musicians as well
as dancers commonly describe the feeling of oneness with others
and the music, of losing themselves and the sense of their body
to the moment, and even becoming possessed by an external
force (Benzon, 2001, 147). It is notable that, in many cultures,
such behaviors are associated with, indeed used to induce, altered
states of consciousness, such as trance, in which delusions of
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control and altered bodily sensations commonly occur (Rouget,
1985; Becker, 1994; Aldridge and Fachner, 2006).
It has been proposed that collective pursuits involving joint
action may have evolved to establish and maintain group
cohesion (Mithen, 2005; Kirschner and Tomasello, 2010; Reddish
et al., 2013; Tarr et al., 2014). This has been supported by
findings that associate movement synchrony between individuals
with increased feelings of social closeness and affiliation (Decety
and Sommerville, 2003; Hove and Risen, 2009; Valdesolo and
Desteno, 2011) – a process possibly mediated by the concomitant
release of neurohormones such as endorphins (Dunbar et al.,
2012; Launay et al., 2016). However, the experience resulting
from participating in such joint activities is not typically one of
complete and involuntary abandonment. This is because effortful
cohesion demands self-awareness and some ability to integrate
with others. Indeed, coordinating actions with others to an
extent that permits the blurring of boundaries require effective
monitoring of self in relation to others to ensure that adjustments
of behavior that enable the desired emergent ambiguity to
persist. For example, not being able to simultaneously monitor
one’s own voice and those of other ensemble members when
singing in a choir – completely immersing in the illusion of
oneness – is likely to result in going out of tune or out of time
with others, reemphasizing the differences that exist between
participants. Thus, the performance of joint behaviors requires
fluid shifts of attention between monitoring the outcomes of
self, other, and the illusory composite sources of self with
other.
EXPERIENCE-DRIVEN PLASTICITY OF
SELF
In keeping with findings from research into expert performance
(Ericsson et al., 1993), the more time a person spends engaged
in activities which challenge accurate self–other attributions,
the better that person is likely to become at making such
distinctions. If this is the case, individuals with extensive joint-
action experience might be expected to be better than average at
self–other processing. Music-making experience has already been
associated with fundamental behavioral and cognitive changes
related to agency that are reflected in functional as well as
structural alterations in the brain (reviewed in Jäncke, 2009; Benz
et al., 2015). For example, musical training has been associated
with more pronounced auditory and motor system coupling
(Zatorre et al., 2007), enhanced working memory (e.g., George
and Coch, 2011), practice-induced efficiency in motor regions
(Jäncke et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2012), and the refinement of
cognitive control (e.g., Moreno and Besson, 2006; Helmbold
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2007). Longitudinal and experimental
studies suggest that such improvements result from experience
and the intensity of training rather than from any innate musical
predisposition (e.g., Lahav et al., 2007; Hyde et al., 2009; Moreno
et al., 2009; James et al., 2014). In fact, the reliability of such
findings has meant that expert musicians have been identified as
an ideal cohort to demonstrate mechanisms of experience-driven
neuroplasticity (reviewed in Münte et al., 2002).
The idea that music-making develops self-monitoring abilities
with observable impacts on brain development may have wider
clinical implications. For example, neural changes that result
from extensive musical practice could be expected to implicate
functions and brain regions that have been highlighted in
studies of individuals who report symptoms of schizophrenia,
with neural pattern pointing in opposite directions. A direct
comparison of musicians and schizophrenia patients could
be made with a particular focus on brain regions associated
with agency (see, e.g., David et al., 2008). If the ability to
accurately differentiate self from other at a perceptual level is
malleable and can improve through practice, might such changes
impact on the symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions
that are specifically thought to be rooted in impairments in
self–other processing (Frith et al., 2000; Bentall et al., 2007;
Jeannerod, 2009)? To date there is evidence to suggest music’s
effectiveness in suppressing symptoms of psychosis (Silverman,
2003; Gold et al., 2009; Na and Yang, 2009; Peng et al.,
2010), with musical competence negatively related to symptom
severity in schizophrenia (Kantrowitz et al., 2013). There are
also precedents for using music as a tool for neuro-rehabilitation
(reviewed in Whipple, 2004; Raglio et al., 2008; François et al.,
2015).
WIDER DISCUSSION
It is suggested here that a resilient sense of self, essential to
mental health, equates to a flexible self and, as such, requires
development in contained environments which afford ongoing
opportunities for reality-testing. Experience in contexts that
sustain a high level of ambiguity and allow individuals to
“play” with actual and illusory object boundaries, particularly
those that exist between control belonging to self and other,
provide optimal conditions for forging a sense of self and
provide a buffer to the inevitable individual/internal and
environmental changes and stressors that occur throughout
life.
Somewhat paradoxically, it may be by weakening self–
other and internal–external boundaries – physical and agentic
limits and mental attributions – that an individual comes
to an enhanced awareness of, and ability to negotiate,
perceived shifts in such boundaries. Epstein (1999) suggests
that academic psychology has traditionally focused on the
individual self as something to be strengthened, without
sufficient consideration given to the everyday reality of more
fluid, unintegrated states of mind, which have typically only
been associated with early infancy (the imaginary friend)
and mental illness. As with the young child at play, adult
self-awareness routinely vacillates to include states of bodily
dissociation, as, for example, when one escapes into the
imaginary world of a novel or film (Rochat, 2003). Comparing
the Western notion of the self in relation to understandings
in Buddhist philosophies, Epstein (1999, 85) contrasts the
self as something to be “developed or improved throughout
its one-way journey toward separateness” in the former, to
the self as variously “expanding and contracting, coalescing
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and dissolving, separating and merging” in the latter. Milner
(2010, 181) concurs that experiences of loss of self, for
example as achieved through play, meditation, or absorbed
participation in music and arts, should not be dismissed as
a regression to an earlier, less developed state, but as a
normal phenomenon that enriches perception through the re-
encountering of self in novel ways: “there is a plunge into
no-differentiation which results (if all goes well) in a re-
emerging into a new division of me-not-me, one in which
there is more of the ‘me’ in the ‘not-me,’ and more of the
‘not-me’ in the ‘me’.” In this way, playing with realities and
non-realities and in the gap between self and non-self, without
confusing them lies at the heart of creativity as a dimension
of ordinary wellbeing. In contrast to involuntary experiences
such as the distressing hallucinations and delusions associated
with mental illness, purposive ambiguity-promoting behaviors,
involve a deliberative and ultimately contained surrendering
of conscious control. The extent to which a participant is
able to monitor and influence when and how self disintegrates
and/or merges with others may make the difference between
an ambiguous context that is playful, creative, and promotes
engagement from one that is anxiety-inducing, and potentially
annihilating.
Not all pursuits are equal in this regard. With reference to
collective activities, Pacherie (2011) provides a helpful distinction
between “hierarchical” and “egalitarian” joint action. Using the
Western symphony orchestra as an illustration, she argues that in
the former, tasks are centralized and specialized, with individual
musicians limited in their capacity to control overall outcomes
and instead reliant on diktats from the conductor and the
constraints imposed by the score/composer. In more egalitarian
music systems (often reflecting the collectivist societal structures
in the cultures in which these systems tend to emerge), such
as African drumming, jazz, and gamelan, governance tends to
be distributed across the ensemble. Participants are called upon
to predict and monitor individual and combined outcomes,
controlling for themselves to differing degrees the variation in
coherence and incoherence in relation to one another. This is
more reminiscent of the reciprocal dynamic that exists between
caregiver–infant interactions where the infant is an active agent
and it is safe to momentarily “go to pieces” or merge with the
other, “without falling apart” (Epstein, 1999). Thus, distinct forms
of music-making or joint action afford qualitatively different
subjective experiences of self and other and are likely to mold self-
development in diverse ways. In more general terms, although
all human interactions involve the need to make behavioral
decisions with inadequate information, cultures or communities
of practice can promote ambiguity to greater and lesser extents.
This may be reflected in the tools and symbols that are used
to relate to others. For example, anthropologist Edward Hall
(1992) describes languages as being lower or higher context.
The former refers to linguistic information that is complete,
explicitly contained within the message itself, while a higher
context language is one that relies on a greater degree of
implicit shared knowledge and interpretation from recipients
(Hall, 1992, 229–230). Understanding and questioning the
quality of attunement promoted by social, cultural, and political
structures, the extent to which practices promote or thward
ambiguity between self and other may inform conceptualizations
of mental health and strategies put in place for addressing mental
illness.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
This paper argues that ambiguity (as fundamental characteristic
of many everyday social encounters) plays a key role in
developing the sense of self and in learning to differentiate
between the boundaries of objects including those that exist
between self and other as agents in the world. We propose that
engagement in challenging activities that require self–other
differentiation may provide optimal conditions for refining
reality-testing abilities related to self–other processing. With
cross-modal attunement in early infancy framed as one such
“healthy” ambiguous context that blurs the boundary between
caregiver and infant, the argument positions vulnerability
to psychosis-related phenomena within this developmental
framework (Bentall et al., 2007). However, the case is also
made that attribution competencies negatively associated
with hallucinations and delusions in previous research
may be malleable and improve through practice. Indeed,
certain collective behaviors that put the sense of self into
question by introducing a high degree of coherence between
autonomous agents (e.g., such as music-making, dance, and
certain sports) may be understood as having the functional role
of promoting social bonding by improving self–other monitoring
capabilities. Experience in ambiguity-promoting contexts may
also allow those involved to become better able to tolerate
and creatively “play with” modulating self–other sensations,
freeing up capacity to refine appropriate reality testing reflexes.
This may serve to reduce the likelihood of experiencing
unsolicited and distressing misattributions associated with
psychosis.
The argument presented here allow specific hypotheses to
be generated and tested using behavioral and neuroimaging
methods. For example, one over-riding question is whether
experience in situations of intricate joint action (such as
music-making) positively correlates with the ability to
distinguish between action outcomes belonging to self and
other, particularly in ambiguous contexts, in contrast to
hallucination proneness. What are the neural correlates
of this type of ambiguity and of competencies related to
self–other differentiation? One might then ask whether
improvements in self–other processing, at a perceptual
level, generalizes across domains in adulthood. If so,
would such improvement impact on phenomena such
as hallucinations that have been associated with reduced
attribution performance? Related to this are questions around
the optimal conditions for bringing about change in self–
other processing skills – for example, what types of activities,
and constituent elements therein, work best? Such research
may not only offer insights into mechanisms mediating the
emergence of mental health difficulties, but also has the
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potential to extend the range of therapeutic possibilities. As
Postmes et al. (2014) argue, models of self-disorders such as
schizophrenia that focus on lower-level perceptual mechanisms
are under-represented in research and clinical literatures. Despite
evidence for inter-dependency between top-down and bottom-
up processes (e.g., Adcock et al., 2009; Shea, 2014), few
therapies target “lower” configurations of self (e.g., core sense
of self) that involve more primitive sensations of the body as a
coherent entity/agent and its relation to surroundings including
other agents over time. We believe that more insight into
behavioral and neural responses to ambiguity will contribute to
the design of environments and opportunities that maximize
such development and will increase our understanding of self-
disorders more generally.
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